In a sharply worded exchange during the ongoing Sabarimala reference hearings, the Supreme Court of India questioned the very foundation and purpose of a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) filed by the Indian Young Lawyers’ Association, which had originally sought the entry of women into the Sabarimala temple. The Court’s remarks signal a deeper judicial unease with the evolving nature of PIL jurisprudence, particularly where such petitions intersect with questions of faith, standing, and institutional legitimacy.
The controversy traces back to the 2006 PIL that eventually culminated in the landmark 2018 judgment permitting women of all ages to enter the Sabarimala temple. That verdict, grounded in constitutional principles of equality and non-discrimination, marked a transformative moment in Indian constitutional law. However, the present proceedings before a nine-judge Constitution Bench are not concerned with the correctness of that verdict per se, but with broader questions relating to the interplay between religious freedom and other fundamental rights.
During the hearing, the Court subjected the very maintainability of the original PIL to scrutiny. It questioned how an organisation, as a juristic entity, could claim a right to worship or assert standing in matters intrinsically linked to religious belief. Justice B.V. Nagarathna, in particular, posed pointed questions to the counsel, asking what tangible outcome had emerged from the PIL and why it was filed at all. The Bench also raised concerns regarding whether the petitioning body represented genuine devotees or was acting on abstract or external considerations.
The Court’s critique extended beyond mere standing. It highlighted that the PIL had been instituted on the basis of newspaper reports and without demonstrable institutional backing, including the absence of a formal board resolution. Such observations indicate a possible characterisation of the petition as an abuse of process, raising serious concerns about the threshold for invoking the Court’s extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 32.
Further amplifying its scepticism, the Bench questioned the broader trend of PILs being used as instruments of publicity, political positioning, or ideological assertion rather than genuine public interest. In related observations reported during the hearing, the Court remarked that PILs have increasingly transformed into vehicles of “publicity, paisa, and political interest litigation,” reflecting a systemic concern about misuse of this otherwise vital constitutional tool.
This judicial discomfort is doctrinally significant. Public Interest Litigation, historically conceived as a mechanism to expand access to justice and protect the rights of marginalised groups, has over time undergone both expansion and dilution. The present remarks of the Court suggest a recalibration an attempt to restore doctrinal discipline by insisting on genuine locus standi, credible material, and demonstrable public interest.
The Court’s interrogation also intersects with a deeper constitutional question: who has the authority to challenge religious practices? The Bench’s queries suggest a cautious approach toward allowing non-believers or unconnected entities to litigate issues of faith. This aligns with emerging judicial thought that religious autonomy under Articles 25 and 26 must be balanced against external interventions, particularly where the petitioner lacks a proximate or genuine connection to the faith in question.
At a critical level, the Court’s remarks may be read as a subtle reconsideration of the procedural pathway through which the Sabarimala issue reached constitutional adjudication. While the substantive outcome of the 2018 judgment remains a milestone for gender equality, the present scrutiny raises questions about whether the process itself met the rigorous standards expected of PIL litigation. This distinction between substantive justice and procedural legitimacy is central to the Court’s evolving reasoning.
However, the implications of such an approach are complex. On one hand, stricter scrutiny of PILs may prevent frivolous or motivated litigation and preserve judicial resources. On the other, an overly restrictive approach could potentially deter genuine public-spirited interventions, especially in cases where affected individuals may lack the capacity or resources to approach the Court directly.
Ultimately, the proceedings reflect a moment of introspection within Indian constitutional jurisprudence. The Supreme Court appears to be re-examining not just the boundaries of religious freedom, but also the procedural architecture through which such questions are brought before it. By questioning the very premise of the Sabarimala PIL, the Court is signalling that the legitimacy of constitutional adjudication depends as much on the integrity of the process as on the correctness of the outcome.
