India’s quasi-judicial framework came under intense scrutiny this week as the Supreme Court trained its lens on a troubling institutional blind spot — the near-complete absence of accountability mechanisms governing the heads and members of the country’s statutory tribunals. A bench comprising Chief Justice Surya Kant and Justice Joymalya Bagchi did not mince words while deliberating on petitions challenging provisions of the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021, raising a question that strikes at the heart of judicial governance: if tribunal members answer neither to the government nor to the judiciary, who exactly are they answerable to?
The Court’s discomfort was rooted in observable ground realities. Tribunal members, it noted, were continuing in their positions even when their performance fell well below acceptable standards — some allegedly incapable of independently authoring judgments or resolving cases within reasonable timeframes. Yet, no corrective mechanism existed to address such deficiencies. In the Court’s assessment, this represented a structural failure that the legal framework had so far failed to remedy.
The constitutional tension underlying this issue is delicate. Placing tribunals squarely under governmental supervision risks turning them into instruments of executive convenience, undermining their independence as adjudicatory bodies. Conversely, bringing them fully within the judicial fold raises separation of powers concerns. This institutional no-man’s land, the bench observed, has allowed underperformance to fester without consequence — a situation untenable for bodies entrusted with dispensing justice to thousands of litigants.
Compounding the structural concern is the practice of allowing administrative members — those without a judicial background — to preside over tribunals as acting heads. Critics and bar associations have long argued that this arrangement dilutes the judicial character that tribunals are constitutionally obligated to preserve. The bench acknowledged this concern as one requiring urgent legislative attention.
Attorney General R. Venkataramani, representing the Union of India, sought to assure the Court that the government was not indifferent to these concerns. He disclosed that the Centre was actively working on revising the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021 — a statute already under judicial challenge for allegedly falling short of the Supreme Court’s own binding guidelines, particularly on matters of minimum tenure and service conditions. He indicated that the proposed amendments would be finalized within approximately six months and committed that no sitting member would be asked to vacate their position upon completion of their current term in the interim, thereby preventing operational disruptions.
The bench responded by directing petitioner bar associations — who have been vocal critics of the existing framework — to channel their institutional expertise productively by submitting concrete recommendations on how accountability of tribunal members could be effectively and constitutionally structured. The matter has been scheduled for review in May 2026, by which point the Court expects the government to demonstrate tangible legislative headway.
At its core, this episode reflects a broader unresolved question in Indian administrative law: how does a democracy build expert judicial bodies that are simultaneously independent, accountable, and insulated from political influence? The answer, it appears, remains a work in progress.
