The ongoing nine-judge Constitution Bench hearings in the Sabarimala reference have evolved into one of the most consequential constitutional debates in modern India, with lawyers before the Supreme Court arguing that social reform may necessarily require judicial scrutiny of religious practices and that constitutional adjudication in such matters could legitimately employ the proportionality test. The proceedings have now moved far beyond the original controversy over women’s entry into the Sabarimala temple, transforming into a larger constitutional inquiry into the relationship between faith, reform, equality, and State power.
On the fourteenth day of hearings, Senior Advocate Jaideep Gupta, appearing for the State of Kerala, argued that the Constitution itself recognizes the necessity of social reform within religious spaces. Referring specifically to Article 25(2)(b), Gupta submitted that exclusionary social practices often acquire a religious character precisely to shield themselves from scrutiny, and therefore courts cannot entirely avoid examining religious practices while adjudicating issues of social welfare and reform.
His submissions strike at the heart of one of the most difficult constitutional dilemmas in Indian jurisprudence: whether practices claimed as religious can remain immune from judicial review even when they conflict with constitutional guarantees of equality, dignity, and non-discrimination. Gupta argued that courts may necessarily have to examine whether a disputed practice is genuinely religious, secular, or merely a social custom clothed in religious legitimacy. In doing so, he defended the continued relevance of the Essential Religious Practices (ERP) doctrine, asserting that courts are not engaging in theological adjudication but discharging a constitutional obligation to distinguish protected religious freedom from practices susceptible to reform.
The Supreme Court Bench, however, simultaneously signalled caution regarding the constitutional limits of social reform. Justice B.V. Nagarathna observed during the hearing that reform cannot “hollow out” religion itself and warned that constitutional guarantees under Article 25(1) cannot be violated in the name of reformist objectives. The observation reflects the Court’s continuing attempt to balance two competing constitutional commitments: individual equality and collective religious autonomy.
The nine-judge Bench headed by Chief Justice of India Justice Surya Kant is currently examining broader constitutional questions arising from the 2018 Sabarimala verdict, where a five-judge Constitution Bench by majority had struck down the prohibition on entry of women aged between 10 and 50 into the Sabarimala temple. That judgment had characterised the exclusionary practice as unconstitutional and inconsistent with gender equality. However, following nationwide controversy and review petitions, the Court referred larger constitutional questions concerning religious freedom and denominational rights to a nine-judge Bench in 2019.
The present hearings therefore extend far beyond Sabarimala itself. The Court is examining foundational questions concerning the scope of Articles 25 and 26, the meaning of “constitutional morality,” the extent of judicial review over religious practices, and whether denominational rights are subordinate to other fundamental rights within Part III of the Constitution.
One of the most intellectually significant developments in the hearings has been the invocation of the proportionality doctrine as a constitutional tool for resolving conflicts between religious freedom and social reform. Senior Advocate Menaka Guruswamy reportedly argued that restrictions upon constitutional rights must satisfy the proportionality standard meaning they must pursue a legitimate objective, remain necessary, adopt the least restrictive means, and avoid disproportionate harm.
The introduction of proportionality into the Sabarimala reference could have transformative implications for Indian constitutional law. Traditionally, Indian religious freedom jurisprudence has relied heavily upon the ERP doctrine, under which courts determine whether a disputed practice is “essential” to a religion. Critics, however, have long argued that this framework forces secular courts into theological inquiry and creates inconsistent standards. The proportionality approach potentially shifts constitutional analysis away from theological centrality toward balancing competing constitutional interests such as dignity, equality, liberty, and religious autonomy.
This transition is jurisprudentially significant because proportionality has increasingly become the dominant constitutional standard in rights adjudication globally and within Indian constitutional law itself. The doctrine has already shaped decisions concerning privacy, free speech, surveillance, and civil liberties. Its possible extension into religious freedom adjudication signals the Court’s attempt to modernise constitutional analysis beyond rigid doctrinal categories inherited from earlier decades.
Several lawyers during the hearing also argued that Indian constitutionalism historically envisages reform within religion itself rather than strict separation between State and faith. Guruswamy reportedly contended that unlike certain Western constitutional models premised upon non-interference, the Indian Constitution deliberately empowers the State and courts to intervene in discriminatory religious practices where social reform becomes necessary. This argument draws heavily from the Constituent Assembly’s understanding that caste exclusion, untouchability, and gender discrimination frequently operated under the cover of religious legitimacy.
The debate has also revived scrutiny of the ERP doctrine itself. Advocate Talha Abdul Rahman Farasat reportedly criticised the doctrine as a “narrow bottleneck” that excessively restricts religious freedom analysis. According to this line of reasoning, constitutional protection should depend not upon whether a practice is “essential” in theological terms but whether the belief is sincerely held and compatible with constitutional values. Such arguments indicate growing judicial and academic dissatisfaction with courts functioning as arbiters of religious orthodoxy.
The hearings additionally reveal deep judicial concern regarding the limits of constitutional intervention in matters of faith. Several judges expressed apprehension that excessive scrutiny of religious customs may open floodgates for constitutional challenges against centuries-old practices across religions. Justice Nagarathna reportedly cautioned that India remains a civilisation deeply connected with religion and that courts must remain sensitive to the broader societal implications of aggressive judicial intervention.
At the same time, intervenors supporting reform-oriented interpretation argued that constitutional courts cannot adopt a “hands-off” approach where religious practices infringe dignity, bodily autonomy, or equality. Senior Advocate Raju Ramachandran reportedly argued earlier during the hearings that public morality cannot be permitted to override constitutional morality because such an approach would subordinate minority rights and individual freedoms to dominant social beliefs.
The proceedings also expose a deeper philosophical tension embedded within Indian secularism itself. Unlike strict separationist models, Indian secularism has historically permitted principled State intervention in religion for purposes of social reform. The abolition of untouchability, temple entry reforms, and legislative interventions into personal laws all emerged from this constitutional tradition. The present hearings may ultimately determine how far this reformist constitutional vision can extend into contemporary disputes involving gender equality and denominational autonomy.
Critically analysed, the hearings demonstrate that the Sabarimala reference is no longer merely a dispute concerning temple entry. It has evolved into a constitutional contest over the future direction of Indian secularism, the legitimacy of judicial review in religious matters, and the balance between collective faith and individual rights. The Court’s eventual ruling may fundamentally reshape constitutional doctrine governing religious freedom for decades.
The proportionality argument is especially noteworthy because it offers a possible middle path between absolute religious autonomy and unrestricted judicial intervention. Rather than either blindly accepting religious claims or aggressively invalidating traditions, proportionality requires courts to examine whether exclusionary practices pursue legitimate objectives and whether less restrictive alternatives exist. Such an approach could potentially create a more nuanced constitutional framework capable of respecting both faith and equality.
Ultimately, the Sabarimala hearings now represent one of the most ambitious constitutional conversations in independent India. The questions before the nine-judge Bench concern not only temple entry but the very structure of constitutional democracy in a deeply religious society: whether constitutional values can legitimately reform inherited traditions, and if so, how courts should balance reform against religious freedom without either annihilating religion or permitting constitutional rights to become subordinate to exclusionary customs.
