The retirement of Allahabad High Court judge Justice Shekhar Kumar Yadav, while an impeachment motion against him remained pending in Parliament, has brought into sharp focus a fundamental institutional paradox within India’s constitutional framework the absence of an effective and time-bound mechanism for judicial accountability.
While the event formally marks the end of a judicial tenure, its implications extend far beyond an individual judge. It raises a deeper and more uncomfortable question:
can a constitutional system that provides for removal of judges fail to operationalise it in practice?
Justice Yadav demitted office on April 15, 2026, even as impeachment proceedings initiated in the Rajya Sabha remained incomplete. The motion for his removal had been triggered by controversial remarks made in December 2024 during a public event, where statements attributed to him—touching upon majoritarian governance and minority communities—sparked widespread criticism and calls for accountability.
Despite the gravity of the allegations, the impeachment process failed to advance to a conclusive stage. Procedural delays, including verification of signatures and lack of institutional momentum, ensured that the motion remained pending for over a year. With his retirement, the proceedings now stand effectively terminated, as the constitutional mechanism for impeachment applies only to sitting judges.
At his farewell address, Justice Yadav defended his position, asserting that his remarks had been “misrepresented” and that he had always maintained impartiality on the Bench. Yet, the legal significance of the episode lies not in competing narratives, but in the systemic inability to adjudicate them within the framework provided by the Constitution.
The Indian Constitution envisages impeachment as the sole mechanism for removing judges of the higher judiciary, requiring a rigorous parliamentary process involving a special majority. While this high threshold is intended to preserve judicial independence, the present case demonstrates its unintended consequence practical inoperability.
Unlike other accountability mechanisms in constitutional democracies, India’s impeachment process suffers from absence of defined timelines, heavy reliance on political consensus and procedural complexity susceptible to delay
As a result, even serious allegations may remain unresolved, creating what legal commentators have described as an “accountability vacuum.” The episode also highlights a jurisdictional overlap between institutional actors. Following the controversy, the Supreme Court Collegium reportedly considered initiating an in-house inquiry. However, once impeachment proceedings were set in motion in Parliament, the matter was effectively treated as falling within the legislative domain.
This institutional ambiguity where neither the judiciary nor Parliament fully completes the process reveals a structural lacuna in India’s accountability design. From a constitutional perspective, the case sits at the intersection of two competing imperatives: Judicial independence, which requires insulation from political pressure and Judicial accountability, which demands mechanisms to address misconduct
The present framework appears to prioritise the former to such an extent that the latter risks becoming illusory in practice. The implications of this episode are not merely procedural they are normative. Public confidence in the judiciary rests not only on independence, but also on perceived integrity and accountability. When allegations against a sitting judge remain unexamined due to procedural delays, it risks undermining institutional legitimacy.
This concern is particularly acute in cases involving public statements by judges, where the boundary between personal expression and judicial propriety becomes blurred. The absence of a conclusive process leaves both the allegations and the defence untested, creating a lingering ambiguity.
