Chief Justice of India Surya Kant has placed judicial transparency and institutional accountability at the centre of an important constitutional conversation, asserting that the judiciary cannot seek public confidence by insulating itself from scrutiny. Speaking at the Sixth Ram Jethmalani Memorial Lecture in New Delhi on the theme “Justice Seen to Be Done: Transparency and Public Trust as Pillars of the Legal System”, the CJI emphasised that fair, informed and constructive criticism of judicial functioning is not an attack on judicial independence but an essential feature of a constitutional democracy. His intervention assumes particular significance at a time when questions concerning judicial appointments, complaints against judges, institutional transparency and the relationship between courts and public opinion are increasingly entering public discourse.
The central proposition emerging from the CJI’s address was that public confidence in courts cannot be equated with public approval of judicial outcomes. A judiciary exercising constitutional power cannot reasonably expect to be trusted simply because its decisions are accepted or welcomed by the majority. Courts routinely decide disputes in which one side must lose, and constitutional adjudication often requires courts to protect rights precisely when doing so may be unpopular. The more meaningful test of institutional legitimacy, Justice Kant suggested, is whether even a person who loses a case can ultimately accept that the procedure through which the decision was reached was fair, reasoned and impartial.
This distinction between trust and approval is doctrinally significant. Public approval is inherently unstable because it depends upon the immediate result of a particular case. Judicial legitimacy, by contrast, is supposed to derive from legality, reasoning, procedural fairness and institutional independence. A court that decides cases according to popular sentiment may enjoy temporary approval but would sacrifice the very independence that gives constitutional adjudication its legitimacy. Conversely, a court may deliver an unpopular judgment and still strengthen public trust if the reasoning is accessible, the hearing is fair and the legal principles are consistently applied.
The CJI’s remarks therefore point towards a deeper understanding of the phrase “justice must be seen to be done”. Visibility, in this context, cannot mean merely allowing litigants and lawyers to enter an open courtroom. Judicial transparency must extend to the intellectual process through which judicial power is exercised. Justice Kant stressed that the reasoning behind a decision must remain open to examination, including by those against whom the judgment is delivered. A judgment that merely announces a conclusion without making its reasoning intelligible would fall short of the deeper meaning of transparency.
That proposition is particularly important in constitutional adjudication because judicial power is exercised through reasons. Unlike political institutions, courts do not derive legitimacy from electoral mandates. Their authority rests upon constitutional text, precedent, procedural fairness and the persuasiveness of legal reasoning. The written judgment is therefore not simply a formal record of the outcome. It is the principal mechanism through which the judiciary explains to the litigants, the legal profession and society why state power has been exercised in a particular manner.
In this sense, reasoned judgments perform a democratic function even though judges themselves are unelected. They make judicial authority answerable to law rather than personality. They allow appellate courts to examine the correctness of lower-court decisions, enable lawyers to identify doctrinal errors, permit academics to critique legal reasoning and allow citizens to understand how constitutional principles are being applied. Transparency in judicial reasoning is consequently not a concession made by the judiciary to public opinion; it is intrinsic to the rule of law.
Justice Kant’s remarks also carry particular relevance against the background of the Supreme Court’s recent proceedings concerning an NCERT Class VIII textbook that contained a reference to corruption in the judiciary. The proceedings became an occasion for the Court to consider the boundaries between criticism of judicial institutions and criticism that is unfair, uninformed or institutionally destructive. The proceedings were subsequently closed after the textbook was revised, and the Court emphasised that fair, informed and constructive criticism of judicial functioning has a legitimate role in a constitutional democracy.
The NCERT episode is significant because it demonstrates the tension inherent in judicial institutions. Courts must protect their institutional integrity, but institutional integrity cannot mean institutional immunity from criticism. If every critical description of the judiciary is treated as an attack upon the administration of justice, the distinction between legitimate institutional accountability and contemptuous conduct risks becoming blurred. On the other hand, criticism based upon demonstrably false allegations, deliberate misinformation or an intention to obstruct the administration of justice presents a different legal problem.
The correct constitutional balance lies in distinguishing criticism from delegitimisation. A lawyer, academic, journalist, litigant or citizen must be able to question a judgment, identify inconsistencies in doctrine, criticise administrative decisions and demand institutional reform without automatically being regarded as hostile to the judiciary. At the same time, criticism cannot become a licence to fabricate allegations, intimidate judges or deliberately undermine proceedings. The protection of judicial independence and the freedom to scrutinise judicial functioning are therefore not contradictory propositions; they are two sides of a constitutional balance.
Justice Kant’s reference to the late Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer’s understanding of institutional accountability reinforces this point. Institutions, in that conception, do not remain credible because they are protected from exposure; they remain credible because they repeatedly withstand legitimate scrutiny. Public confidence that depends upon insulation from criticism is inherently fragile. Public confidence that survives examination is considerably stronger because it rests upon institutional performance rather than institutional reverence.
The CJI’s observations are also noteworthy because they came in the context of wider concerns raised during the memorial lecture regarding judicial administration. Senior Advocate Harish Salve questioned the handling of the controversy surrounding the discovery of cash at the residence of former Delhi High Court judge Justice Yashwant Varma, while Senior Advocate Mahesh Jethmalani raised concerns concerning alleged “fixer lawyers”, judicial corruption and the functioning of tribunals. Questions were also raised regarding reforms in the judicial appointments process and the Collegium system.
These interventions are important not because every allegation made in a public forum should automatically be accepted, but because they demonstrate the very institutional dialogue that Justice Kant’s speech seeks to protect. Questions regarding appointments, complaints against judges, administrative accountability and alleged interference in judicial processes are not inherently illegitimate merely because they concern the judiciary. The constitutional system must possess lawful mechanisms through which such concerns can be examined, tested and, where warranted, acted upon.
On judicial appointments, Justice Kant acknowledged that reform should remain a continuing process and that no institution can afford to regard itself as permanently complete. At the same time, he defended the functioning of the Collegium system, pointing to the constitutional and historical development of the present appointment mechanism and the fact that appointments ultimately involve deliberations between constitutional institutions. He indicated that while reforms are welcome, there are also questions that may not be prudent to answer through public exchanges.
This position captures one of the more difficult aspects of judicial accountability. Transparency cannot mean that every internal deliberation must immediately become a matter of public disclosure. Judicial independence requires institutional spaces in which sensitive allegations and appointment decisions can be examined without being converted into political contests. But confidentiality cannot become a substitute for accountability either. The constitutional challenge is therefore to create systems in which relevant information is sufficiently available to establish institutional credibility while legitimate confidentiality is preserved where necessary.
The issue becomes even more complex in relation to complaints against judges. Justice Kant stated that the mechanisms developed by the Supreme Court and High Courts for dealing with complaints against judicial officers and judges are robust, responsive and timely. At the same time, he acknowledged that such mechanisms are capable of further reform and qualitative improvement.
The CJI also raised an important practical concern: if every interlocutory order, adjournment or final judgment were to generate a publicly displayed complaint against the concerned judge, the complaint mechanism itself could become a means of pressuring the judiciary. A litigant disappointed by an interim order could potentially characterise an adverse decision as misconduct. A system that treats every grievance as a public allegation against a judge could therefore weaken judicial independence rather than strengthen accountability.
This does not mean that complaints should be hidden or ignored. It means that accountability requires institutional design. A credible complaint mechanism should distinguish between a judicial error that can be corrected through appeal and conduct that raises questions of integrity, bias or serious misconduct. The former belongs principally to the appellate process; the latter requires an independent and credible administrative mechanism. Confusing the two can both undermine judges and deprive genuine complaints of the seriousness they deserve.
The distinction is fundamental to the rule of law. Judges are not immune from error, and the appellate system exists precisely because judicial decisions can be wrong. But a wrong judgment is not necessarily evidence of judicial misconduct. Similarly, a complaint alleging misconduct cannot automatically be dismissed merely because it originates from a litigant. The legal system therefore requires filtering mechanisms capable of separating dissatisfaction with adjudication from credible allegations concerning judicial behaviour.
This is where transparency must be accompanied by institutional discipline. Publishing every complaint without preliminary scrutiny could damage reputations and create opportunities for strategic litigation. Concealing every complaint behind institutional confidentiality could generate the opposite problem—a perception that the judiciary is investigating itself without meaningful external accountability. The legitimacy of the mechanism will therefore depend upon its independence, procedural fairness, objective standards and capacity to communicate appropriate outcomes.
Justice Kant’s speech consequently presents transparency not as unrestricted disclosure but as reasoned openness. The judiciary must explain enough of its functioning for citizens to understand how power is exercised, while preserving those limited areas of confidentiality genuinely necessary for institutional functioning. That distinction is particularly relevant to the Collegium, judicial complaints, administrative decisions and disciplinary processes.
The debate also has an important relationship with contempt jurisdiction. A constitutional judiciary must possess authority to prevent conduct that obstructs justice or deliberately undermines judicial proceedings. But contempt powers become constitutionally healthier when legitimate criticism remains clearly protected. The Supreme Court’s recent observations on fair and informed criticism indicate an institutional recognition that the authority of courts does not depend upon eliminating disagreement.
Indeed, disagreement is inevitable in a constitutional democracy. Judicial decisions interpret legislation, invalidate executive action, determine individual liberty, regulate economic activity and sometimes resolve deeply contested social questions. If the public is permitted to debate political decisions but not judicial decisions, an important part of constitutional governance would remain outside democratic discussion. Judicial independence should protect the adjudicatory process from improper pressure; it should not transform judicial reasoning into an untouchable subject.
There is also an important distinction between judicial independence and judicial insulation. Independence means that judges must be able to decide cases without fear, favour or external coercion. Insulation would mean that judicial institutions are placed beyond meaningful examination. The former is indispensable to constitutional democracy; the latter would be difficult to reconcile with the principle that all public power must ultimately remain accountable to law.
The CJI’s formulation is therefore constructive because it places public trust on institutional performance rather than institutional mystique. The judiciary does not need to be universally liked. Nor can it reasonably satisfy every litigant. Its legitimacy instead depends upon whether its processes remain fair and whether its reasons withstand legal and intellectual examination.
This understanding becomes particularly important in an age of social media, where criticism of judgments can rapidly move beyond legal analysis and into polarised political commentary. The solution cannot simply be greater institutional defensiveness. Courts must simultaneously strengthen their own communication, ensure accessible judgments and distinguish informed criticism from misinformation. Citizens, lawyers and journalists likewise have a responsibility to engage with actual judicial reasoning rather than reducing complex judgments to isolated sentences or politically convenient interpretations.
The recent expansion of technology in the judicial system also provides an opportunity to deepen this form of transparency. Live-streaming of constitutional proceedings, publicly accessible judgments, transcripts, translation initiatives and simplified explanations of significant decisions can make judicial reasoning available to a much larger audience. Transparency becomes meaningful only when the material made public is understandable and usable by the people whose lives are affected by judicial decisions.
But transparency should not be confused with public relations. The judiciary is not required to convince citizens that every judgment is correct. Its responsibility is to ensure that the reasons for its decisions are legally defensible and capable of scrutiny. The legitimacy of a judgment must come from its reasoning, not from an institutional campaign designed to generate approval for it.
That is why the distinction drawn by the CJI between trust and approval is perhaps the most important element of his address. Approval is transient; trust is cumulative. Approval asks whether a court produced the desired result. Trust asks whether the system was fair even when the result was adverse. The latter is much closer to the constitutional conception of justice.
For the legal profession, this also imposes responsibilities on both sides of the Bar. Lawyers must be free to challenge judicial reasoning fearlessly, but professional criticism must remain grounded in facts and law. Judges, in turn, must remain receptive to legitimate criticism and should not regard disagreement as institutional disloyalty. A mature Bar-Bench relationship depends upon precisely this reciprocal confidence: advocates must be able to speak candidly, while judges must be able to distinguish advocacy from personal attack.
The same principle extends to legal scholarship and journalism. A judiciary that expects public trust must accept that its judgments will be studied, compared, criticised and sometimes rejected by academics and commentators. Such examination does not weaken the judiciary. On the contrary, it provides an additional layer of intellectual accountability that can expose doctrinal inconsistencies and encourage legal development.
There is, however, an equally important caution. The CJI’s endorsement of scrutiny should not be understood as an endorsement of every allegation made against judges or courts. “Constructive criticism” contains an important qualification. Criticism must be fair, informed and rational. A constitutional democracy protects disagreement precisely because disagreement is valuable when it is based on facts and reason. Falsehood presented as criticism does not become constitutionally valuable merely because the target is a public institution.
The deeper constitutional lesson is therefore one of institutional confidence. A strong judiciary should not fear examination because its legitimacy ultimately rests on its capacity to justify the exercise of power. At the same time, a strong judiciary must maintain procedures capable of protecting judges against malicious or strategically motivated attacks. Accountability and independence are not competing objectives when the institutions designed to secure them are properly calibrated.
The Ram Jethmalani Memorial Lecture consequently became more than a ceremonial tribute to one of India’s most prominent lawyers. It became an occasion to examine the continuing constitutional question of how an unelected institution exercises immense public power while retaining public legitimacy. Justice Kant’s answer was not that courts should seek popularity. It was that courts should remain transparent enough, reasoned enough and open enough to scrutiny that even disagreement with their decisions does not automatically become distrust of the institution itself.
The proposition that “justice must be seen to be done” therefore acquires a contemporary meaning. It is not sufficient for a court to believe internally that its process is fair. The fairness of that process must be capable of being understood and examined externally. This does not require every judicial action to be explained in public or every internal deliberation to be disclosed. It requires the institution to remain answerable to law, to reason and to legitimate scrutiny.
Ultimately, the judiciary’s strongest defence against criticism is neither contempt jurisdiction nor institutional status. It is the quality of its work. Reasoned judgments, transparent procedures, accessible records, credible complaint mechanisms, fair hearings and principled administration provide a far more durable foundation for public confidence than insulation from criticism ever could.
Chief Justice Surya Kant’s message therefore carries significance beyond the immediate debate over judicial criticism. It places a constitutional responsibility on the judiciary to demonstrate that independence does not mean immunity from examination. At the same time, it places an equally important responsibility on the Bar, media, academia and citizens to ensure that scrutiny remains informed and constructive. The health of constitutional democracy ultimately depends upon both sides of that equation.
A judiciary that cannot be questioned risks becoming distant from the society in whose name it exercises power. A judiciary that can be questioned, explains itself through reasoned decisions, corrects its institutional shortcomings and survives sustained scrutiny demonstrates something more valuable than popularity: constitutional credibility. Public trust, as the CJI’s address makes clear, is not obtained by demanding that society believe in the institution. It is earned when the institution remains willing to prove, repeatedly and transparently, that it deserves that belief.
