In a significant reaffirmation of judicial independence and the limits of recusal jurisprudence, the Delhi High Court has held that the mere fact that a judge’s children are empanelled as Central Government counsel cannot constitute a valid ground for alleging bias. The Court observed that if such a standard were accepted, “a large part of the judiciary” would be compelled to recuse from government-related matters an outcome that would severely disrupt the administration of justice.
The observation was made by Justice Swarana Kanta Sharma while rejecting a recusal application filed by Arvind Kejriwal in connection with proceedings arising from the Delhi excise policy case. The petitioner had alleged a conflict of interest on the ground that the judge’s children had been empanelled as government panel lawyers and had received assignments over the past few years.
Rejecting the plea, the Court delivered a strong institutional response, holding that such allegations were speculative and lacked any direct nexus with the case at hand. It clarified that professional engagements of family members, in the absence of demonstrable personal interest or involvement in the specific proceedings, cannot be equated with judicial bias. Accepting such claims, the Court reasoned, would create an impractical and unworkable precedent affecting courts at all levels.
The judgment engages deeply with the doctrine of reasonable apprehension of bias, a foundational principle in Indian judicial ethics. While this doctrine does not require proof of actual bias, it mandates that the apprehension must be reasonable, objective, and based on credible material. The Court found that the allegations raised did not meet this threshold and were based on conjecture rather than substantiated facts.
Importantly, the Court cautioned against allowing litigants to dictate recusal through tenuous or strategic allegations. It observed that permitting such practices would open the floodgates to bench hunting, where parties attempt to influence the composition of the bench to suit their interests. Such a development, the Court warned, would erode public confidence in the judiciary and undermine institutional stability.
The ruling also reinforces a broader constitutional principle—that judicial independence must be protected not only from actual bias but also from attempts to delegitimise the judiciary through unfounded allegations. The Court emphasised that recusal is a matter of judicial conscience and discretion, not a tool to be invoked at the behest of litigants based on subjective perceptions.
At a structural level, the decision reflects the realities of the legal profession in India, where it is not uncommon for family members of judges to practice law, including representing government entities. The Court recognised that disqualifying judges on this basis alone would be impractical and would paralyse the functioning of courts across jurisdictions.
Analytically, the judgment draws a crucial distinction between institutional proximity and legal conflict. While proximity may arise from professional ecosystems, a legally cognisable conflict requires a direct and substantial connection to the matter in dispute. By maintaining this distinction, the Court has preserved the integrity of recusal jurisprudence and prevented its dilution into a tactical litigation strategy.
The case also reflects a broader trend of recusal applications being increasingly used in politically sensitive or high-profile litigation. The Court’s firm stance sends a clear message that judicial processes cannot be shaped by strategic allegations, and that the presumption of judicial impartiality remains a cornerstone of the rule of law.
In conclusion, the ruling of the Delhi High Court reaffirms that the threshold for recusal must remain high to protect both the independence and functionality of the judiciary. By rejecting speculative claims of bias, the Court has reinforced the principle that justice must not only be done but must be insulated from attempts to manipulate its process through unfounded perceptions.
