In a deeply philosophical and constitutionally significant exchange during the ongoing Sabarimala reference proceedings, the Supreme Court of India questioned the long-term implications of subjecting every religious practice to constitutional scrutiny, asking: “What happens to Indian civilisation if every religious practice is questioned in courts?” The remark, made by Justice B.V. Nagarathna during hearings before a nine-judge Constitution Bench, reflects the Court’s growing concern over the extent to which constitutional courts should intervene in matters of faith, denomination, and religious autonomy.
The observation came while the Bench was hearing arguments relating to the Dawoodi Bohra excommunication dispute, which has been tagged with the broader Sabarimala reference concerning the scope of judicial review under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution. Senior Advocate Raju Ramachandran, appearing for reformist members challenging the practice of excommunication, argued that the power exercised by the religious head of the community violated individual dignity and fundamental rights. In response, the Bench repeatedly questioned whether courts could become forums for adjudicating every intra-religious disagreement without destabilising the cultural and civilisational foundations of Indian society.
Justice Nagarathna’s remarks were particularly striking because they framed the issue not merely as a legal dispute but as a civilisational dilemma. She observed that religion in India is “intimately connected” with social life and warned that indiscriminate judicial intervention could trigger endless litigation challenging religious customs and institutional practices. According to the Bench, the question before the Court is not limited to whether a particular practice survives constitutional scrutiny, but also whether constitutional adjudication itself possesses manageable limits in matters of faith.
Justice M.M. Sundresh echoed similar concerns, cautioning that if courts begin entering every theological or denominational dispute, “religions will break.” The Bench appeared apprehensive that constitutional litigation could transform courts into arbiters of religious correctness rather than guardians of constitutional legality. This concern reflects a larger anxiety about the judiciary assuming a role that may effectively reshape religious traditions through judicial interpretation rather than democratic or internal reform processes.
At the heart of the proceedings lies the unresolved constitutional conflict between Articles 25 and 26. Article 25 guarantees individual freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess and practice religion, while Article 26 protects the autonomy of religious denominations to manage their own affairs in matters of religion. The nine-judge Bench is examining how these provisions interact, and more importantly, whether denominational autonomy can be subjected to constitutional equality standards.
The hearings have therefore reopened one of the most contested doctrinal questions in Indian constitutional law: should courts determine what constitutes an “essential religious practice,” or should they defer once a practice is shown to be genuinely religious? During earlier hearings, the Bench repeatedly questioned the workability of the “essential religious practices” doctrine, asking how courts are institutionally equipped to evaluate theological authenticity.
The Court’s observations also indicate a visible shift from the rights-centric language that dominated the 2018 Sabarimala judgment. In that landmark verdict, a Constitution Bench had held that the exclusion of women between the ages of 10 and 50 from the Sabarimala temple violated constitutional guarantees of equality and dignity. The current reference, however, appears to be moving toward a more restrained understanding of judicial review in religious matters, with several judges questioning whether public interest litigations should become instruments for restructuring faith traditions at the instance of non-adherents.
This emerging judicial approach reflects a broader institutional concern regarding the limits of constitutional morality. Petitioners supporting reform have argued that no religious practice can survive if it violates fundamental rights. Yet the Bench has repeatedly countered by asking whether constitutional courts should enter domains historically governed by faith, custom, and community consensus. Justice Nagarathna observed that what the Court lays down in this reference “is for a civilization,” highlighting the extraordinary consequences the ruling may carry for India’s plural religious landscape.
At the same time, the Court has not entirely endorsed unchecked denominational autonomy. In earlier hearings, the Bench observed that practices involving caste exclusion or threats to public order may fall outside constitutional protection. It also questioned discriminatory practices affecting Parsi women and examined whether exclusionary customs can legitimately claim immunity merely because they are religiously rooted.
The proceedings thus reveal a judiciary internally negotiating competing constitutional visions. One vision emphasizes transformative constitutionalism, where courts actively dismantle exclusionary practices in the name of equality and dignity. The other stresses constitutional pluralism and judicial restraint, warning that aggressive intervention may erode the autonomy of religious communities and destabilize India’s multicultural social fabric.
Critically, the Court’s remarks also raise questions about the future of Public Interest Litigation in religious matters. Several judges openly questioned whether PILs filed by non-believers or third parties should be entertained at all in disputes involving denominational practices. This could potentially narrow the scope of constitutional challenges against religious customs and shift reform discourse away from courts toward legislatures and internal community processes.
The significance of the Sabarimala reference extends far beyond temple entry. The eventual ruling is likely to impact a range of disputes involving mosque entry, excommunication, denominational rights, gender-based exclusions, and the future of the essential religious practices doctrine itself. It may ultimately determine whether constitutional courts remain active engines of social reform in religious matters or adopt a more restrained role grounded in institutional humility.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s observation questioning what would happen to Indian civilisation if every religious practice is challenged in courts captures the profound constitutional tension at the centre of the Sabarimala reference. The hearings have evolved into a larger debate about the identity of the Indian Constitution itself whether it is primarily transformative and interventionist, or pluralist and deferential toward religious autonomy. As the nine-judge Bench continues its deliberations, the case is poised to redefine the relationship between faith, reform, and constitutional adjudication in India.
