In a significant ruling at the intersection of free expression, electoral regulation, and judicial restraint, the Madras High Court has dismissed writ petitions seeking to restrain the screening of the film “Dhurandhar 2: The Revenge” in Tamil Nadu during the ongoing Assembly elections.
The decision reinforces a key constitutional principle courts cannot curtail artistic expression in the absence of a clear statutory prohibition, even during the subsistence of the Model Code of Conduct (MCC).
A Division Bench comprising the Chief Justice and Justice G. Arul Murugan categorically held that there exists no legal framework prohibiting the release or screening of films during the election period. The Court questioned the very foundation of the plea, observing “What is the law that a movie cannot be released when the Model Code of Conduct is in place?” This observation strikes at the heart of the petitioner’s argument, which sought to expand the scope of the MCC beyond its established domain.
A decisive factor in the Court’s reasoning was the fact that the film had already received certification from the Central Board of Film Certification (CBFC) the statutory authority empowered under the Cinematograph Act to regulate film content. The Court held that the CBFC certification had not been challenged. In the absence of such challenge, judicial intervention to restrain screening would be legally impermissible
In effect, the Court reaffirmed that once a statutory body has cleared a film, courts cannot indirectly nullify that approval through collateral proceedings. The petitioners had argued that the film allegedly showcased achievements of the ruling political dispensation, particularly in areas such as national security and counter-terrorism, which could influence voters during the election period.
Relying on provisions of the Model Code of Conduct, they contended that media cannot be used for partisan publicity during elections even if not funded by the public exchequer, the spirit of the MCC should extend to such content. However, the Court rejected this expansive interpretation, noting that the MCC primarily regulates the conduct of political parties and candidates and use of public resources and official machinery not private creative works released through independent commercial channels.
The ruling aligns with a consistent judicial approach that courts must exercise restraint once the electoral process is underway. Across multiple recent cases, including those involving nomination deadlines and electoral procedures, courts have declined to interfere mid-process, emphasizing that election management lies primarily within the domain of the Election Commission of India. The present decision extends that principle into the domain of media and cultural expression during elections.
The case raises a broader constitutional tension that article 19(1)(a) guarantees freedom of speech and expression, including artistic expression and article 19(2) permits reasonable restrictions in the interest of public order and electoral integrity. However, the Court’s approach indicates that mere apprehension of influence on voters is insufficient. There must be a clear statutory violation or demonstrable illegality. In the absence of such violation, restricting a film’s release would amount to prior restraint, which courts have traditionally approached with caution.
The ruling has important implications. It clarifies that the Model Code of Conduct is not a blanket censorship tool. It prevents overreach into creative and commercial domains. It reinforces the authority of statutory regulators like the CBFC. Most importantly, it sends a clear message that judicial intervention cannot be invoked to regulate perceived political messaging in films without a concrete legal basis.
The Madras High Court’s decision to allow the screening of Dhurandhar 2 during elections marks a reaffirmation of constitutional discipline that restrictions on speech must flow from law, not conjecture. By refusing to stretch the Model Code of Conduct beyond its intended scope, the Court has preserved a delicate balance between electoral fairness and freedom of expression, ensuring that judicial processes are not used to indirectly censor artistic works during politically sensitive periods.
