The Delhi High Court has declined to entertain a challenge brought by P.B. Agro LLP, the master licensee associated with Vimal Elaichi, against show-cause notices issued by the Maharashtra Food and Drug Administration to Bollywood actors Shah Rukh Khan, Ajay Devgn and Tiger Shroff over advertisements for the product. Justice Swarana Kanta Sharma dismissed the petition on the ground that the Delhi High Court lacked territorial jurisdiction to examine the challenge and held that the courts in Maharashtra constituted the more appropriate and convenient forum for adjudicating the grievance. Significantly, the Court did not decide whether the advertisements amounted to surrogate promotion of Vimal Pan Masala. The ruling was confined to the preliminary question of jurisdiction.
The distinction is legally important because the dispute has attracted considerable public attention owing to the involvement of three prominent actors, but the order itself is not an adjudication on the legality of their endorsements. The Court did not pronounce upon whether the Vimal Elaichi advertisements violated food-safety law, whether the campaign constituted indirect promotion of pan masala, or whether the actors themselves had committed any regulatory violation. What the Court determined was narrower but fundamental: whether a regulatory action initiated by a Maharashtra authority against persons residing in Maharashtra could be brought before the Delhi High Court merely because the company associated with the product had its business operations in Delhi and some elements of the advertising arrangement were connected with the capital.
The controversy originated with a show-cause notice dated August 11, 2026 issued by the Assistant Commissioner (Food), Food and Drug Administration, Greater Mumbai Division. The notice was directed to Shah Rukh Khan, Ajay Devgn and Tiger Shroff, who had appeared in promotional material for Vimal Elaichi. The Maharashtra regulator took the prima facie view that the campaign could amount to surrogate promotion of Vimal Pan Masala, which is prohibited in Maharashtra. The regulator questioned whether Vimal Elaichi was genuinely an independently marketed product or whether its branding was being used to maintain or strengthen consumer association with the prohibited pan masala product.
The notice reportedly required the actors to furnish material demonstrating the independent identity and availability of Vimal Elaichi and to provide information concerning their endorsement arrangements and due diligence. The regulator also called for cessation of the promotional activity and removal of associated material from digital platforms. The action consequently placed celebrity endorsements within the larger regulatory debate over surrogate advertising—a practice in which a permitted product or brand extension is allegedly used to indirectly promote a product whose direct advertisement is prohibited or restricted.
The regulatory concern has a statutory background. Maharashtra has prohibited the manufacture, storage, transportation, distribution and sale of gutka and pan masala containing tobacco or nicotine under the Food Safety and Standards Act framework, with the prohibition being periodically renewed. The current prohibition was stated to have been renewed from July 13, 2026. The FDA’s concern was therefore not simply that the actors were advertising an ordinary mouth-freshener product, but that the visual identity and brand association allegedly carried the promotional value of a prohibited pan masala product.
This distinction is crucial to the concept of surrogate advertising. The legal question is not necessarily answered merely by asking what product appears in the advertisement. A regulator may look beyond the literal description of the advertised commodity and examine whether the campaign, considered as a whole, effectively promotes the identity of a restricted product. Brand name, visual presentation, packaging, colour schemes, celebrity association, market recognition and the relationship between the permitted and restricted products can potentially become relevant depending upon the statutory provision invoked.
At the same time, not every brand extension automatically constitutes surrogate advertising. A manufacturer may legitimately sell different products under a common brand name, and the mere existence of a restricted product bearing the same brand does not by itself establish that an advertisement for another product is unlawful. The regulatory inquiry must therefore distinguish between a genuine and independently marketed product and a purported brand extension that functions principally as a vehicle for indirect promotion of a prohibited commodity. This is ultimately a question of evidence and statutory application, which the Delhi High Court deliberately left open.
P.B. Agro approached the Delhi High Court challenging the Maharashtra FDA action. The company contended that it operated from Delhi and that substantial elements of its advertising arrangements were connected with the capital. It also argued that the advertisements could be viewed in Delhi and that payments to the celebrity endorsers were made from Delhi. According to the company’s case, these circumstances furnished a sufficient connection with Delhi for invoking the High Court’s writ jurisdiction under Articles 226(1) and 226(2) of the Constitution.
The company also relied upon the presence of central regulatory institutions in Delhi. The Food Safety and Standards Authority of India and the Central Consumer Protection Authority were impleaded, and P.B. Agro sought to rely upon their location in the national capital as another connecting factor. Its argument was essentially that the regulatory controversy had a sufficient Delhi component because the company was based there, its commercial operations were conducted there and the national regulatory authorities were situated in the city.
The respondents resisted that approach. The Centre argued that the notice under challenge had been issued by the Maharashtra FDA’s Assistant Commissioner in Mumbai, that the three recipients of the notice were residents of Mumbai and that the impugned regulatory action originated entirely within the Maharashtra administrative framework. The mere fact that the petitioner happened to have its business base in Delhi could not, according to the respondents, convert a Maharashtra regulatory action into a Delhi cause of action.
The Court ultimately accepted the substance of that objection. Justice Swarana Kanta Sharma examined whether any substantial or material part of the cause of action had arisen within Delhi. The Court found that the petitioner’s reliance upon its Delhi operations was insufficient, particularly because the impugned notice had not even been addressed to P.B. Agro itself. The notice had been issued by the Maharashtra FDA to the three celebrity endorsers in relation to alleged activities and statutory violations in Maharashtra.
The reasoning reflects a settled constitutional principle governing writ jurisdiction. Article 226(2) permits a High Court to exercise jurisdiction where the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises within its territorial limits, even when the authority against whom relief is sought is located outside that territory. But the existence of some incidental connection is not necessarily sufficient. Courts have repeatedly distinguished between a substantial component of the cause of action and a remote or insignificant connection manufactured merely to select a convenient forum.
That distinction is particularly relevant in an era in which commercial activity is geographically dispersed. A company may be headquartered in Delhi, advertise nationally, engage actors residing in Mumbai, use a production agency in another city, maintain servers elsewhere and distribute its products throughout India. If every such connection automatically created territorial jurisdiction, regulatory disputes could be litigated in multiple High Courts simultaneously. The constitutional provision permitting jurisdiction where part of the cause of action arises cannot therefore be interpreted as granting an unrestricted choice of forum.
The Court was particularly unconvinced by the attempt to rely upon the location of FSSAI in Delhi. The fact that FSSAI is the apex regulatory body under the food-safety statute does not, by itself, transform an independent enforcement action by a State FDA into an action attributable to the central authority. The Court observed that the source and character of the impugned notice remained the action of the FDA in Mumbai.
This is a significant point concerning administrative law. The mere presence of a superior or coordinating statutory authority within a particular State does not necessarily give that State’s High Court territorial jurisdiction over every decision made by a subordinate or parallel authority elsewhere. Jurisdiction must ordinarily be connected to the actual administrative action being challenged and the relief sought against the authority responsible for it.
The Court also examined the petitioner’s decision to implead the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare and FSSAI. Merely adding authorities located in Delhi to the array of respondents cannot manufacture territorial jurisdiction where none otherwise exists. The Court noted that no specific relief was sought against those authorities and that the petitioner had not challenged any independent order or direction issued by them.
The principle has broader relevance to writ litigation. Jurisdiction is determined by the substance of the dispute rather than by the number of respondents placed on the cause title. A petitioner cannot ordinarily create jurisdiction merely by adding an authority located within the territorial limits of a High Court when that authority has neither issued the impugned decision nor taken any action for which relief is sought.
The Court then invoked the doctrine of forum conveniens. Even assuming that some incidental part of the cause of action could arguably be said to have arisen in Delhi, the Court held that Maharashtra was the more appropriate and convenient forum for resolving the dispute. The impugned notice originated there, the regulatory authority was located there, the notice recipients were residents there and the alleged regulatory violations concerned activities within Maharashtra.
The doctrine of forum conveniens introduces an important element of judicial restraint into territorial jurisdiction. The existence of jurisdiction does not invariably mean that a court must exercise it. Where another court has a substantially closer connection with the dispute and can more effectively supervise the relevant administrative action, the court approached may decline to entertain the proceedings. The principle is intended to prevent forum shopping and ensure that litigation is placed before the court with the most meaningful institutional connection to the controversy.
The decision is therefore significant for commercial entities operating across State boundaries. National advertising campaigns frequently involve agencies, celebrities, manufacturers and regulators situated in different jurisdictions. The judgment signals that a company cannot necessarily select the High Court of its registered office whenever it challenges an enforcement action initiated elsewhere. The location of the corporate headquarters is relevant only if it forms a substantial component of the cause of action or otherwise satisfies the constitutional jurisdictional test.
The Court’s approach also has consequences for celebrity endorsement disputes. In the present case, the three actors who received the notices were residents of Mumbai. The regulatory authority that issued the notices was in Mumbai. The notices themselves concerned conduct allegedly having regulatory consequences within Maharashtra. From a jurisdictional standpoint, these factors provided a considerably stronger connection to Maharashtra than the petitioner’s corporate presence in Delhi.
The order nevertheless leaves unresolved the more substantive and potentially contentious question: can a celebrity be proceeded against merely because he or she appears in an advertisement for a product which a regulator believes operates as a surrogate for a prohibited product? That question will now have to be considered, if challenged, by the appropriate forum in Maharashtra.
Its answer will require careful examination of the statutory scheme. Food-safety regulation is not identical to tobacco advertising regulation or consumer-protection law. The Food Safety and Standards Act contains provisions dealing with misleading advertisements and prohibited representations, while the Consumer Protection Act and the rules governing misleading advertisements impose additional obligations on advertisers and endorsers. The Cigarettes and Other Tobacco Products Act separately prohibits direct and indirect advertising of tobacco products. The legal liability of a celebrity therefore depends upon the particular statute and provision invoked, the nature of the alleged representation and the person’s role in making or disseminating it.
Section 24 of the Food Safety and Standards Act, for instance, places restrictions upon misleading or deceptive food advertisements and advertisements contravening the statutory framework, while Section 53 provides consequences for misleading advertisements. The regulatory question is therefore not simply whether a particular brand has a restricted product associated with it, but whether the impugned advertisement falls within the statutory prohibition. That requires evidence and legal analysis rather than assumption.
The present order is important precisely because the Delhi High Court refused to prejudge that substantive issue. The Court expressly stated that its dismissal was based on territorial jurisdiction and forum conveniens and that it was not expressing an opinion on the merits of P.B. Agro’s challenge.
This restraint is significant. A show-cause notice is ordinarily an invitation to explain why regulatory action should not be taken; it is not itself a final determination of guilt or liability. Courts exercising writ jurisdiction generally exercise caution in interfering at the notice stage, particularly where the statutory authority possesses jurisdiction and the allegations require factual determination. The jurisdictional defect was therefore addressed first, leaving the appropriate forum to consider the substantive objections if and when they are brought before it.
The dispute also raises a larger question about the responsibility of celebrity endorsers in modern advertising. Celebrities increasingly function not merely as passive faces in advertisements but as powerful instruments of brand recognition. Their personal reputation can substantially influence consumer perception. This raises legitimate regulatory concerns where a restricted product is alleged to be promoted indirectly through a permissible product carrying the same or substantially similar brand identity.
But regulatory responsibility must also be legally structured. A celebrity cannot automatically be presumed to possess the same knowledge or control as the manufacturer. Conversely, an endorsement contract cannot necessarily immunise an endorser if the law imposes independent obligations upon persons participating in misleading advertising. The proper legal inquiry must therefore consider the statutory duty, the actual role of the endorser, the representation communicated, the available knowledge and due diligence, and the evidence establishing the alleged connection with the prohibited product.
The FDA’s demand for information regarding due diligence is consequently noteworthy. The notices reportedly sought details of the actors’ endorsement arrangements and the steps they took to establish whether Vimal Elaichi was an independent product or part of an indirect promotional strategy.
That approach reflects the increasing importance of due diligence in celebrity advertising. In an environment where regulatory scrutiny of misleading advertisements has intensified, an endorser’s role cannot necessarily be assessed solely by asking who manufactured the product. The law is increasingly concerned with the entire chain through which a commercial representation reaches consumers.
Nevertheless, regulatory enthusiasm cannot substitute for statutory authority. Any eventual action against the actors will have to identify the precise legal provision allegedly violated and establish the factual elements required by that provision. A regulator cannot convert the general concept of surrogate advertising into an offence without demonstrating its statutory basis.
This is where the next stage of the litigation may become considerably more interesting than the Delhi jurisdiction dispute. If the matter reaches a Maharashtra court on merits, the court may have to examine whether Vimal Elaichi has a genuine independent commercial existence, whether it is actually sold and marketed as a distinct product, whether the advertisement primarily communicates the permitted product or evokes the prohibited product, and what significance should be attached to the common brand identity.
The evidentiary question may become particularly important. A regulator seeking to establish surrogate advertising cannot necessarily rely only upon consumer familiarity with a brand. It may need to demonstrate how the advertisement operates in context and why the allegedly permissible product is being used as a vehicle for promoting the restricted one. Market data, packaging, sales information, advertising history, brand architecture, campaign material and consumer-facing representations could potentially become relevant depending upon the statutory proceedings.
The controversy therefore illustrates a broader transformation in Indian advertising law. Regulatory scrutiny is moving beyond the literal wording of advertisements towards the overall commercial effect of marketing campaigns. The law is increasingly concerned not only with what an advertisement expressly says but also with whether the campaign, taken as a whole, circumvents restrictions imposed upon particular categories of products.
Yet that evolution must remain bounded by legal certainty. Businesses must be able to determine in advance what conduct is prohibited, while regulators must have sufficient power to prevent sophisticated circumvention of statutory restrictions. The challenge for courts will be to preserve that balance without allowing either side to convert commercial branding or regulatory suspicion into conclusive proof.
For now, however, the Delhi High Court has deliberately left those questions unanswered. Its ruling does not exonerate the Vimal Elaichi campaign, nor does it validate the Maharashtra FDA’s allegations. It simply holds that the dispute was brought before the wrong High Court. Maharashtra, rather than Delhi, is the forum that has the closer connection with the regulatory action and is therefore better placed to examine the grievances arising from the notice.
The judgment thus serves as a useful reminder that territorial jurisdiction is not a technical preliminary objection detached from substantive justice. In a federal judicial structure, the allocation of disputes among High Courts is itself an aspect of constitutional design. State authorities must ordinarily answer for their statutory actions before the courts territorially connected with those actions, while litigants cannot use corporate headquarters, national advertising reach or the location of central institutions as a shortcut to forum selection.
The Vimal Elaichi dispute will consequently continue, but on a different judicial stage. The next substantive chapter will concern the legality of the FDA’s concerns, the evidentiary threshold for establishing surrogate promotion and, potentially, the extent to which celebrity endorsers can be held responsible for advertisements involving products connected to restricted commodities.
That larger controversy has implications well beyond three actors or one brand. It concerns the boundary between legitimate brand extension and regulatory circumvention, between commercial speech and misleading promotion, and between a celebrity’s contractual role as an endorser and the independent responsibilities imposed by consumer and food-safety law.
For the moment, the Delhi High Court has made one proposition clear: a company cannot convert its Delhi presence into a jurisdictional gateway for challenging a regulatory action fundamentally rooted in another State. The Court’s refusal to enter the merits is equally significant. By directing the controversy towards the more appropriate forum without prejudging the allegations, the judgment preserves the distinction between jurisdictional adjudication and substantive regulatory determination. The question whether the Vimal Elaichi campaign was genuinely an advertisement for cardamom or an indirect vehicle for promoting a prohibited pan masala product remains open—and it is that question, rather than the celebrity names attached to the controversy, that the next stage of the legal proceedings will ultimately have to answer.
