In a significant hearing that may influence the future application of India’s law on unlawful assembly and rioting, the Supreme Court of India has expressed serious reservations over the tendency to invoke rioting provisions merely because an individual was present among a crowd that later turned unruly. Hearing the Chandigarh Administration’s challenge to the Punjab and Haryana High Court’s decision quashing criminal proceedings against Punjab Minister Aman Arora and other Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) leaders, the Court orally observed that “mere presence in an unruly group will not result in sharing common intention” and cautioned against an expansive application of Sections 147 and 148 of the Indian Penal Code. The Bench further remarked that there was no allegation that Aman Arora had exhorted violence, indicating that criminal liability cannot be inferred merely because a political leader was physically present during a protest that subsequently witnessed violence.
The matter came up before a Bench comprising Chief Justice of India Surya Kant, Justice Joymalya Bagchi and Justice Vipul Pancholi. The appeal arises out of a 2020 protest march organised by AAP leaders in Chandigarh against the increase in electricity tariffs. During the demonstration, clashes allegedly occurred between protestors and the police after barricades were erected to prevent the procession from moving towards official residences. The Chandigarh Police registered an FIR invoking Sections 147 (rioting), 149 (every member of an unlawful assembly guilty of offences committed in prosecution of the common object), 332 (voluntarily causing hurt to deter a public servant from duty), and 353 (assault or criminal force to deter a public servant from discharge of duty) of the Indian Penal Code against several AAP leaders, including Bhagwant Mann, Aman Arora, and others.
The Punjab and Haryana High Court, in November 2025, quashed the FIR, the charge-sheet and all consequential proceedings. After examining the material collected during investigation, the High Court concluded that no prima facie case existed against the political leaders. It observed that while stones were allegedly thrown by certain persons in the crowd after police used water cannons, no overt act was attributed to the petitioners, no specific words of instigation were identified, and no evidence showed that they had directed or encouraged the alleged acts of violence. The High Court further noted that no prohibitory order under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was in force at the protest site, thereby weakening the prosecution’s allegation that the gathering itself was unlawful.
Before the Supreme Court, Additional Solicitor General S.V. Raju, appearing for the Chandigarh Administration, argued that the High Court had prematurely quashed the prosecution despite there being sufficient prima facie material to warrant a trial. According to the Administration, the political leaders were not passive spectators but were leading the demonstration and were therefore liable for the acts committed by the crowd. It was contended that whether they instigated the protestors or shared the common object of the assembly was ultimately a matter to be determined during trial rather than at the stage of quashing proceedings.
The Supreme Court, however, appeared cautious in accepting such a broad proposition. During the hearing, Justice Joymalya Bagchi made observations that are likely to have considerable significance in criminal jurisprudence. Referring to the offences of rioting, the Court observed that while active participation is not always necessary for attracting liability under Sections 147 or 148 IPC, mere presence in an unruly crowd cannot automatically lead to the inference that every individual shared the common object or common intention of those who actually committed acts of violence. The Court warned that an overly expansive interpretation of rioting provisions could dangerously extend criminal liability to virtually every person present at a political demonstration, thereby risking abuse of penal law.
Equally significant was the Bench’s observation that there was no allegation that Aman Arora had exhorted the crowd to violence. Justice Bagchi remarked that it would be legally unsustainable to infer criminal responsibility solely because an individual belonged to a political party or happened to be present at the protest. The Court thus indicated that leadership of a political demonstration cannot, by itself, substitute the statutory ingredients required for criminal liability under the IPC.
The Bench ultimately adjourned the matter and directed that it be heard together with the Chandigarh Administration’s connected appeal concerning Punjab Chief Minister Bhagwant Mann, in which the Court had earlier observed that “everyone does naarebaazi in democracy” while indicating reluctance to interfere with the High Court’s decision unless substantial legal grounds were demonstrated.
Although the observations remain prima facie and do not constitute the Court’s final determination, they raise important questions concerning the interpretation of Sections 141 to 149 of the Indian Penal Code. These provisions govern unlawful assembly, rioting, and vicarious criminal liability arising from offences committed by members of an assembly pursuing a common object.
Section 141 IPC defines an unlawful assembly as an assembly of five or more persons having one of the common objects specified in the provision, such as resisting lawful authority, committing an offence, or using criminal force. Section 147 prescribes punishment for rioting, while Section 149 creates a rule of constructive liability by providing that every member of an unlawful assembly becomes guilty of offences committed in prosecution of the common object if such offences were known to be likely to be committed.
However, Indian criminal jurisprudence has consistently maintained that Section 149 does not abolish the requirement of establishing membership of the unlawful assembly coupled with awareness of its common object. Courts have repeatedly distinguished between mere presence at the scene of occurrence and participation in an assembly sharing a common unlawful purpose. The doctrine of constructive liability is intended to prevent organised group violence from escaping punishment, but it cannot be interpreted so broadly as to criminalise every bystander or peaceful participant who happens to be present when violence unexpectedly erupts.
The Supreme Court’s observations resonate with long-standing precedent emphasising that common object cannot be presumed merely from physical proximity. The prosecution must ordinarily establish circumstances demonstrating that the accused knowingly associated themselves with the unlawful objective of the assembly. While direct evidence of exhortation is not always indispensable, courts generally examine factors such as prior conduct, weapons carried, behaviour during the incident, active participation, or other surrounding circumstances before inferring the existence of the requisite common object.
The present case also illustrates the distinction between peaceful protest and criminal assembly. The Constitution guarantees citizens the freedoms of speech, expression and peaceful assembly under Article 19(1)(a) and Article 19(1)(b). These freedoms undoubtedly remain subject to reasonable restrictions in the interests of public order. Nevertheless, constitutional protection of peaceful dissent would be significantly weakened if criminal liability were imposed upon every political participant solely because isolated members of a large crowd subsequently engaged in unlawful conduct.
This constitutional dimension has repeatedly featured in judicial decisions concerning political demonstrations. Indian courts have consistently recognised that democratic governance necessarily accommodates protests, rallies and public demonstrations. At the same time, participants who personally indulge in violence or intentionally encourage unlawful acts remain fully liable under criminal law. The challenge for courts lies in ensuring that criminal accountability remains individualised rather than collective.
The High Court’s judgment, which is now under challenge, reflected this philosophy. It found that the charge-sheet did not identify the persons who allegedly threw stones, nor did it specify any words, gestures or acts through which the political leaders instigated violence. According to the High Court, the prosecution essentially sought to infer criminal liability from leadership status without demonstrating the statutory ingredients necessary for offences under Sections 147, 149, 332 and 353 IPC.
The proceedings also illustrate the growing judicial scrutiny applied to criminal prosecutions arising out of political protests. Across multiple decisions, constitutional courts have emphasised that the extraordinary power to prosecute political opponents must be exercised with careful regard to statutory requirements and constitutional safeguards. Quashing jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (now reflected in the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita framework) continues to serve as an important judicial mechanism for preventing prosecutions where essential ingredients of an offence are absent on the face of the record.
From a broader constitutional perspective, the Supreme Court’s observations reaffirm that criminal law punishes conduct, not association. Membership of a political party, participation in a demonstration, or presence within a crowd cannot by themselves establish criminal guilt. Liability must continue to rest upon legally recognised evidence establishing participation, intention or the sharing of a common unlawful object.
The final outcome of the Chandigarh Administration’s appeal remains to be decided after detailed hearing. Nevertheless, the oral observations already made by the Bench send an important signal regarding the careful interpretation of offences relating to unlawful assembly and rioting. As political demonstrations continue to form an integral part of democratic life, the judiciary’s role becomes increasingly significant in maintaining the delicate balance between preserving public order and protecting constitutional freedoms.
Ultimately, the proceedings underscore an enduring principle of Indian criminal jurisprudence: collective unrest cannot automatically translate into collective criminality. The law undoubtedly punishes those who participate in violence, assault public servants or intentionally pursue unlawful objectives. But constitutional criminal justice equally requires that guilt remain personal, evidence-based and legally demonstrable. The Supreme Court’s caution that mere presence in an unruly group does not automatically establish common intention or common object serves as an important reminder that the rule of law is preserved not by expanding criminal liability indiscriminately, but by ensuring that every prosecution satisfies the precise requirements imposed by criminal statutes and constitutional due process.
