The Supreme Court has cleared the way for implementation of the resolution plan for the long-stalled Sushant Aquapolis housing project in Ghaziabad, adopting a pragmatic solution to an otherwise difficult conflict between insolvency resolution, development-control regulations and competing claims concerning access to the project land. The Court permitted the Successful Resolution Applicant, One City Infrastructure Private Limited, to develop a 24-metre-wide pathway along three boundaries of the project, while expressly prohibiting it from asserting any title over the land. The decision is significant because it places the practical revival of a distressed residential project and the interests of its homebuyers at the centre of a dispute that had otherwise become entangled in questions of development licences, land possession and regulatory approvals.
A Bench comprising Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice K. Vinod Chandran passed the order after examining the difficulties that had prevented the resolution plan from moving forward despite its approval under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. The corporate debtor, Ansal Urban Condominium Private Limited, had promoted the Sushant Aquapolis group housing project at Dhoondera in Ghaziabad. The insolvency process was initiated in March 2022, following which the project entered the statutory framework intended to rescue the financially distressed developer rather than allow the housing project to drift indefinitely towards liquidation.
The litigation illustrates one of the central difficulties in real-estate insolvency: obtaining approval of a resolution plan does not necessarily mean that the successful resolution applicant can immediately execute it. Construction of a housing project depends upon a web of external permissions development licences, sanctioned building plans, access to the property, infrastructure approvals and compliance with local planning regulations. Where those regulatory components remain unresolved, an otherwise viable resolution plan can become commercially meaningless.
That is precisely what appears to have happened in Sushant Aquapolis. One City Infrastructure emerged as the Successful Resolution Applicant, but implementation encountered obstacles concerning renewal of the development licence and approval of a revised building plan by the Ghaziabad Development Authority. The development licence concerning the larger 99-acre parcel was held by the third respondent, while development had already taken place over approximately 26 acres. The dispute over the remaining land and the status of the existing development created a regulatory and logistical barrier to implementation of the approved plan.
The Supreme Court had already expressed considerable concern over the prolonged delay. During proceedings in July 2026, the Bench noted that approximately 1,600 homebuyers had been waiting for their homes for nearly 19 years. The Court questioned the Uttar Pradesh Government and the Ghaziabad Development Authority as to why the approvals required for implementation of the resolution plan had not been resolved despite the passage of such an extraordinary period.
The judicial concern was therefore not confined to a technical dispute over the authority’s licensing power. Behind the competing legal claims stood hundreds of families whose investments had remained locked in a project for years. The Court’s observation that the authorities were supposed to protect the interests of the homebuyers demonstrated the direction in which the proceedings were moving: regulatory questions could not be considered in isolation from the human and economic consequences of continued administrative inaction.
This approach is particularly relevant to the structure of the IBC. The Code does not contemplate insolvency resolution as an abstract exercise in restructuring corporate balance sheets. Its fundamental objective is resolution of insolvency in a manner that preserves value and enables the distressed enterprise or project to be revived wherever feasible. In a real-estate project, that objective necessarily acquires a different complexion because the principal economic stakeholders are often the allottees who are waiting for physical completion rather than merely seeking monetary recovery.
The homebuyers’ position under the IBC has evolved substantially since the statutory recognition of allottees as financial creditors. Their representation in the Committee of Creditors transformed them from largely passive claimants into participants in the resolution process. The Sushant Aquapolis proceedings demonstrate the next stage of that evolution: once a resolution plan has been approved, the institutional objective must be to ensure that the plan can actually translate into construction and possession.
The Court’s intervention also highlights the distinction between approval of a resolution plan and its implementation. Section 31 of the IBC gives an approved resolution plan binding force against the corporate debtor, its employees, members, creditors and relevant governmental authorities. The binding nature of an approved plan is central to the Code because a resolution applicant must be able to rely upon the legal consequences of the plan after investing resources to acquire and revive the distressed enterprise.
That statutory framework becomes complicated when the resolution plan intersects with powers exercised by an independent development authority. The GDA is not merely a creditor of the corporate debtor. It exercises regulatory powers concerning planning and development. Consequently, the IBC cannot simply be interpreted as eliminating every regulatory requirement applicable to the project.
The challenge, therefore, was to determine how the approved resolution plan could be implemented without requiring the development authority to surrender its statutory functions and without allowing regulatory objections to indefinitely frustrate the resolution process.
The Supreme Court’s answer was strikingly practical. Instead of adjudicating title to the disputed road or granting the Successful Resolution Applicant an unrestricted right of access, the Court created a limited arrangement. One City Infrastructure was permitted to develop a 24-metre-wide pathway along the three boundaries of the GH-1 plot. However, neither the applicant nor its assignees would acquire or assert any title over the land merely by undertaking that development.
The distinction between construction of access infrastructure and acquisition of title is legally significant. The Court did not resolve the underlying property dispute by judicial fiat. It instead separated the immediate requirement of access from the question of proprietary rights. In effect, the Court sought to make the project function without prejudging the ultimate title position.
The Court further restricted the manner in which access could be exercised. The Successful Resolution Applicant would not be entitled to use the entire road running along the three boundaries as its exclusive access route. Instead, access to the project would be provided at a single point determined by the Ghaziabad Development Authority. That access would also be non-exclusive and would remain available for use by the third respondent, whose properties were situated around the project.
This qualification reflects an important judicial balancing exercise. The Court was not simply favouring the resolution applicant over the other landholder. It was attempting to create an arrangement under which the housing project could proceed while minimising interference with the interests of adjoining property holders and preserving the regulatory authority of the GDA.
The dispute over the pathway arose because the Successful Resolution Applicant pointed out that the GH-1 parcel did not have functional access necessary for development. The third respondent, however, produced a map indicating the existence of a 24-metre-wide road around three sides of the property. The resolution applicant’s position was that the road was not practically usable because it had not been maintained. It consequently undertook to reconstruct the pathway without claiming ownership over the land.
The Court considered this undertaking sufficient to devise a workable solution. The approach is noteworthy because it demonstrates the difference between adjudication of a legal right and facilitation of an insolvency process. The Court did not declare the resolution applicant the owner of the pathway. Nor did it extinguish the third respondent’s claim. It simply permitted the infrastructure necessary for project revival to be created subject to strict limitations.
Such an approach is particularly suited to real-estate insolvency, where rigid insistence upon resolving every underlying dispute before construction begins may result in precisely the kind of delay that the IBC was designed to prevent. If every land, licence and infrastructure dispute must first travel through years of independent litigation, an approved resolution plan may lose its economic viability before construction even recommences.
The earlier proceedings demonstrate how seriously the Court viewed this problem. On July 30, the Bench directed the State Government and GDA to consult and arrive at a final decision concerning renewal of the development licence and approval of the revised building plan. The Vice-Chairman of the GDA and the Principal Secretary of the Housing Department were also directed to inspect the site and address the outstanding issues.
Following those directions, the GDA submitted an affidavit setting out an action plan. It stated that the relevant representation had been dealt with, that guidance had been provided concerning the integrated township policy and that the building plan could be sanctioned upon the online application being made, while keeping the interests of the homebuyers in view.
The change in the administrative position is important. Judicial intervention did not substitute the GDA’s statutory decision-making power with that of the Court. Instead, the Court compelled the relevant authorities to actually exercise their powers and take a reasoned decision. This is a familiar constitutional principle: judicial review does not ordinarily mean that courts themselves become planning authorities; rather, it ensures that statutory authorities do not refuse to perform their functions or allow matters to remain indefinitely unresolved.
The Court’s concern over the nearly two-decade delay makes the point particularly forcefully. A development authority may have legitimate regulatory concerns, but administrative decision-making cannot become an indefinite holding pattern when thousands of purchasers are awaiting completion of their homes.
The insolvency framework adds another layer to the issue. A resolution applicant evaluates a distressed project based upon the legal and commercial assumptions surrounding it. If regulatory authorities can effectively prevent implementation of an approved resolution plan after the resolution applicant has assumed the project, the predictability of the insolvency process is compromised. Potential resolution applicants may become unwilling to participate in future real-estate insolvencies if regulatory uncertainty can indefinitely prevent implementation.
This is why Section 31 of the IBC assumes particular importance in the broader context. Once a resolution plan is approved, its binding effect is intended to provide finality and certainty to the resolution process. That does not mean that every statutory law disappears before the plan. Rather, authorities whose decisions affect the project must exercise their regulatory powers in a manner compatible with the binding consequences of the approved resolution, subject to their statutory mandates.
The Supreme Court’s approach therefore avoids two extremes. On one side lies an interpretation under which every regulatory authority could frustrate an approved resolution plan by withholding routine approvals indefinitely. On the other lies an interpretation under which the IBC would automatically override every development, land-use or planning requirement. Neither approach would be legally satisfactory.
The practical solution adopted in Sushant Aquapolis attempts to preserve both interests. The GDA remains responsible for determining the point and nature of access. The Successful Resolution Applicant is prohibited from asserting title merely because it constructs the pathway. The third respondent retains use of the access. At the same time, the resolution applicant receives a realistic mechanism through which construction can proceed.
The Court’s emphasis on minimum disturbance to the road is also revealing. The access was not conceived as an unrestricted private corridor. The Court directed that the project should receive access through the road in a manner causing minimum disturbance, and that the eventual access point would be determined by the GDA.
This reflects a broader judicial preference for solutions that preserve the possibility of coexistence between competing interests. In complex infrastructure and real-estate disputes, the choice is not always between granting one party everything it seeks and rejecting its claim altogether. Courts can sometimes create narrowly tailored arrangements that permit essential activity without finally deciding questions that need separate adjudication.
The decision is also significant from the perspective of homebuyer jurisprudence. For years, courts have repeatedly confronted situations in which purchasers are trapped between developers, financial institutions, development authorities and insolvency professionals. The purchaser is often the least responsible actor in the chain but bears the greatest practical consequences of delay.
The Sushant Aquapolis proceedings reinforce the idea that regulatory governance must remain connected with the consequences of delay. A development authority is not merely administering a file. Its decision concerning a licence or building plan may determine whether hundreds or thousands of families receive homes that they may have been promised years earlier.
This does not mean that homebuyer interests automatically override every regulatory requirement. Building safety, land-use restrictions, environmental conditions, infrastructure capacity and statutory planning norms cannot be sacrificed merely because purchasers are waiting. The stronger principle is that regulatory requirements must be applied transparently, promptly and for legitimate statutory purposes rather than becoming indefinite obstacles to project completion.
The facts also expose a recurring problem in stalled housing projects: the distinction between ownership of land and the right to develop it. The larger 99-acre parcel and the 26-acre developed portion were subject to competing claims and arrangements. The development licence was held by the third respondent, while the Successful Resolution Applicant was seeking to implement the approved plan concerning the distressed corporate debtor’s project. The Court was therefore confronted with a project in which corporate insolvency rights, development rights and land-related claims did not perfectly overlap.
That situation illustrates why real-estate insolvency cannot always be solved by applying conventional corporate insolvency principles mechanically. A manufacturing company can often be rescued by transferring its business, assets and liabilities to a resolution applicant. A housing project, by contrast, depends upon physical land, statutory approvals, development permissions and relationships with public authorities. The legal identity of the corporate debtor and the physical identity of the project do not always coincide.
The Supreme Court’s intervention is consequently important as an example of judicially managed coordination rather than straightforward adjudication. The Court recognised that the resolution plan had been approved but also recognised that its implementation depended upon regulatory cooperation. Instead of permitting the two legal regimes to operate in isolation, it brought the relevant authorities before the Court and required them to address the practical obstacles.
The Court’s appreciation of the GDA Vice-Chairman and the Principal Secretary for responding promptly to its directions is noteworthy in this context. The Court recorded its appreciation for the officials’ cooperation during the proceedings. Such an observation indicates that the Court’s criticism of earlier administrative delay was not directed against the statutory authority as an institution but against the consequences of prolonged indecision.
There is, however, a larger institutional question that future cases will have to address: how far should constitutional courts go in supervising the implementation of IBC resolution plans when regulatory approvals are pending? Judicial intervention may be necessary where administrative inaction threatens to defeat a statutory resolution, but courts must also avoid becoming substitute planning authorities.
The present order provides a useful model of limited intervention. The Court did not itself sanction the building plan. It did not confer ownership of the pathway. It did not permanently determine the rights of the competing landholder. Instead, it established parameters within which the existing statutory authorities could facilitate the project.
That distinction is crucial for maintaining institutional boundaries. The judiciary can require the executive to decide; it should ordinarily not become the executive decision-maker. In Sushant Aquapolis, the Court’s directions appear designed to achieve precisely that balance.
The case also raises an important question about the meaning of “resolution” under the IBC. A resolution plan should not be understood as merely a financial settlement between creditors and a resolution applicant. In a real-estate project, resolution ultimately means physical revival of the project and delivery of the intended asset. If a resolution plan is approved but construction cannot commence because necessary approvals remain indefinitely unavailable, the formal resolution may exist on paper while the substantive insolvency remains unresolved.
For homebuyers, therefore, the significance of the order lies in its practical orientation. The objective is no longer merely to determine which stakeholder has the stronger claim over a regulatory permission. The immediate question is how the project can be brought back to life without compromising legitimate legal rights.
The Court’s order also reinforces the need for development authorities to adapt their regulatory decision-making to the realities of insolvency. When an original developer fails, the identity of the entity responsible for completion may change. Authorities must therefore be capable of transferring, renewing or modifying permissions in accordance with law so that a genuine resolution applicant is not defeated merely because an approval was historically issued in the name of a failed promoter.
This does not imply automatic transfer of every licence. Each case will depend upon the governing statute, the terms of the licence, the approved resolution plan and applicable planning regulations. But the regulatory process must recognise that insolvency resolution is a statutory mechanism intended to preserve economic value. Administrative decisions that disregard this reality may inadvertently destroy the very value that the IBC seeks to preserve.
The Sushant Aquapolis order therefore represents a significant development in the growing jurisprudence surrounding stalled real-estate projects. It demonstrates that insolvency courts and constitutional courts are increasingly required to operate at the intersection of private contractual rights, creditor interests, public regulation and the lived reality of homebuyers.
The most important aspect of the ruling may ultimately be its refusal to allow procedural complexity to become an excuse for indefinite delay. Nearly two decades after the project began, the question before the Court was not simply who had the right to a particular road. It was whether a legally approved resolution plan could finally be translated into actual construction.
By permitting the Successful Resolution Applicant to create the necessary 24-metre pathway while preserving title disputes and regulatory authority, the Supreme Court has chosen a middle path: facilitate construction without adjudicating what need not yet be adjudicated; protect homebuyers without extinguishing legitimate property rights; and enforce the practical consequences of insolvency resolution without dismantling the statutory role of the development authority.
The broader lesson is that the success of real-estate insolvency cannot be measured by the approval of a resolution plan alone. A resolution becomes meaningful only when regulatory institutions cooperate sufficiently to make implementation possible. Where thousands of homebuyers have already waited for years, every additional administrative delay carries a real economic and human cost.
The Supreme Court’s intervention in One City Infrastructure Private Limited v. Ghaziabad Development Authority accordingly marks more than another step in the long-running Sushant Aquapolis litigation. It is a reminder that the IBC’s promise of resolution must ultimately be judged on the ground—not by the existence of an approved document, but by whether stalled construction resumes, homes are completed and purchasers finally receive the benefit for which the insolvency process was invoked in the first place.
