The long-pending Sabarimala reference proceedings before the Supreme Court witnessed a significant constitutional intervention this week as Senior Advocate Raju Ramachandran argued that interpreting “morality” under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution as “public morality” would dangerously subordinate fundamental rights to majoritarian social beliefs. His submissions before the nine-judge Bench have reopened one of the most profound constitutional debates in modern Indian jurisprudence: whether constitutional rights are to be governed by evolving constitutional principles or by prevailing societal morality.
Appearing in the expansive reference concerning the scope of religious freedom and judicial review of religious practices, Ramachandran contended that permitting “public morality” to determine the limits of Articles 25 and 26 would effectively allow dominant social groups to define constitutional freedoms. Such an approach, he argued, would undermine the transformative nature of the Constitution and erode protections available to minorities, dissenters, women, and historically marginalized communities.
The submissions arise in the broader context of the Supreme Court’s continuing reconsideration of issues flowing from the landmark 2018 Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala judgment, where a Constitution Bench had struck down the exclusion of women aged between 10 and 50 from entry into the Sabarimala temple. The majority in that case held that exclusionary practices rooted in biological notions of menstruation violated constitutional guarantees of equality, dignity, and religious freedom. (sci.gov.in)
However, following intense social and political backlash, a subsequent five-judge Bench in 2019 referred broader questions relating to essential religious practices, denominational rights, and the intersection between equality and religious autonomy to a larger nine-judge Bench. The present hearings therefore extend far beyond Sabarimala alone; they may ultimately shape constitutional interpretation in disputes involving mosque entry, female genital mutilation, Parsi women’s rights in fire temples, and broader questions of gender justice within religious institutions. (barandbench.com)
Ramachandran’s argument strikes at the conceptual core of constitutional morality—a doctrine that has increasingly shaped progressive constitutional jurisprudence in India. The doctrine gained prominence in judgments such as Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, which decriminalised homosexuality, and Joseph Shine v. Union of India, which struck down adultery laws. In these decisions, the Supreme Court repeatedly emphasised that constitutional rights cannot be constrained merely because prevailing social morality disapproves of certain identities or practices. (sci.gov.in)
According to Ramachandran, reading “morality” in Articles 25 and 26 as “constitutional morality” is essential to preserving the anti-majoritarian character of the Constitution. Otherwise, the rights of vulnerable groups would perpetually remain hostage to dominant social sentiment. His submissions reflect a broader constitutional philosophy that the Indian Constitution was designed not merely to reflect existing social morality but to transform it.
The debate becomes especially significant because Articles 25 and 26 expressly make religious freedom subject to “public order, morality, and health.” The interpretive dispute therefore concerns the meaning of the word “morality” itself. Conservative readings have historically understood it as public morality grounded in societal values and religious traditions. Progressive constitutional interpretation, however, increasingly views it as constitutional morality rooted in liberty, equality, dignity, and fraternity.
Critically, the consequences of this interpretive choice extend far beyond temple entry disputes. If “morality” is equated with prevailing social norms, constitutional protection for unpopular minorities becomes inherently unstable. Practices or identities rejected by dominant groups could be excluded from constitutional protection on grounds of social disapproval. Ramachandran’s warning that “majoritarian notions will prevail” therefore reflects anxiety about democratic majoritarianism overwhelming constitutional liberalism.
The hearings also reveal the continuing tension between two competing visions of the Indian Constitution. One vision treats the Constitution as a transformative document intended to dismantle inherited structures of hierarchy and exclusion. The other emphasizes judicial restraint in matters involving deeply embedded religious traditions and community autonomy. The Sabarimala reference has effectively become the constitutional battleground where these competing philosophies confront each other directly.
At a deeper level, the case raises difficult questions regarding judicial competence in determining what constitutes “essential religious practice.” Indian courts have long struggled with the controversial Essential Religious Practices doctrine, under which judges examine whether contested practices are fundamental to a religion and therefore constitutionally protected. Critics argue that this doctrine forces secular courts into theological adjudication inconsistent with constitutional secularism itself.
Ramachandran’s submissions indirectly challenge that framework by shifting focus away from theological centrality toward constitutional values. The implication is significant: even if a discriminatory practice is religiously sanctioned, it may still fail constitutional scrutiny if it violates equality and dignity guarantees. Such reasoning strengthens the primacy of constitutional morality over ecclesiastical autonomy.
The proceedings also unfold against a politically charged social backdrop. The original Sabarimala verdict triggered mass protests in Kerala, ideological polarisation, and sustained resistance from sections of devotees who viewed judicial intervention as an assault upon religious faith. The continuing hearings therefore represent not merely a legal dispute but a larger societal struggle over the relationship between faith, gender justice, and constitutional authority.
Importantly, the nine-judge Bench’s eventual ruling could substantially redefine the future trajectory of Indian secularism. Indian secularism has historically differed from Western models by permitting principled State intervention in religious practices to advance social reform. The Court’s interpretation of morality within Articles 25 and 26 may determine how far constitutional courts can continue intervening in exclusionary religious customs in the future.
From a jurisprudential perspective, Ramachandran’s arguments revive Dr. B.R. Ambedkar’s original conception of constitutional morality. Ambedkar had repeatedly warned that constitutional democracy cannot survive merely through electoral majorities unless citizens and institutions remain committed to constitutional values over social prejudices. The present debate therefore resonates with foundational anxieties embedded within the constitutional project itself.
Ultimately, the Sabarimala reference is no longer merely about entry into a temple. It has evolved into a defining constitutional inquiry into whether India’s democratic order will be governed primarily by constitutional values or by prevailing social majorities. Raju Ramachandran’s warning before the Supreme Court captures the stakes succinctly: if public morality becomes the governing standard for constitutional freedoms, the Constitution’s role as a shield for minorities and dissenters may itself stand fundamentally weakened.
