The Bombay High Court has ordered a fresh investigation by the Central Bureau of Investigation into the death of Disha Salian, the former manager of actor Sushant Singh Rajput, bringing back into judicial focus a case that has remained surrounded by competing narratives, public speculation and questions concerning the adequacy of the original police inquiry. A Division Bench comprising Justice Sarang V. Kotwal and Justice Ranjitsinha Bhonsale directed the CBI to register a First Information Report, record the statement of Salian’s father Satish Salian and appoint a senior and experienced investigating officer to examine the circumstances surrounding her death. At the same time, the Court consciously stopped short of treating any individual as an accused, making it clear that criminal culpability must emerge from evidence gathered during investigation and cannot be presumed merely because a person’s name has been mentioned in a complaint.
Disha Salian died on June 8, 2020, after falling from a high-rise residential building in Mumbai’s Malad area. At the time, the incident was treated by the Mumbai Police as an accidental death and was investigated through an Accidental Death Report. The police subsequently maintained that the available material pointed towards suicide and that there was no evidence establishing homicide or sexual assault. The case, however, acquired enormous public attention because Salian’s death occurred only a few days before the death of Sushant Singh Rajput, leading over the years to extensive speculation about a possible connection between the two incidents. The present proceedings, however, concern Salian’s death independently, and the High Court’s direction for a CBI investigation does not itself establish any connection between the two deaths.
The petition before the High Court was filed by Salian’s father, who challenged the manner in which the original inquiry had been conducted and alleged that his daughter had been subjected to sexual assault and murdered. He also questioned why an FIR had not been registered despite his subsequent allegations and sought an independent investigation by the CBI. His case was that important aspects of the investigation had not been properly addressed and that relevant material, including the post-mortem report and documents concerning the accidental-death inquiry, had not been adequately supplied to the family. The allegations were strongly contested by the State and by persons whose names had been raised in connection with the matter.
The Court’s intervention is particularly significant because it focused not merely on the competing versions of what happened to Salian but on the legal character of the investigation itself. During the hearing, the Bench repeatedly questioned the State as to why the matter continued to be dealt with through an accidental-death inquiry when allegations subsequently emerged suggesting the possibility of a cognisable offence. The Court questioned whether a prolonged inquiry under Section 174 of the erstwhile Code of Criminal Procedure could effectively substitute for the registration of an FIR and a formal investigation once specific allegations of criminality had been raised. This was not an expression that the allegations were true; rather, the judicial concern was whether the allegations had been subjected to the legally appropriate investigative process.
This distinction is central to understanding the order. Section 174 of the Code of Criminal Procedure primarily contemplates an inquiry into the apparent cause of death in cases such as suicide, accident or suspicious circumstances. It is materially different from the investigative framework that follows registration of an FIR concerning a cognisable offence. The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, particularly the principles flowing from Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh, recognises that where information discloses a cognisable offence, registration of an FIR is ordinarily mandatory, subject to the limited legal framework governing preliminary inquiry. The Bombay High Court’s concern was therefore directed towards the procedural legitimacy of the investigation rather than an advance determination of the ultimate cause of death.
The State defended the police investigation by submitting that the available witness statements, forensic material and medical evidence did not disclose foul play. The prosecution pointed to statements recorded from persons acquainted with Salian and relied upon the post-mortem findings to contend that there was no evidence of sexual assault. The State also questioned the timing and evolution of the father’s allegations, pointing out that members of Salian’s family had previously given statements to the police without raising the allegations that subsequently became the foundation of the petition. The State’s position was essentially that the absence of evidence supporting murder or sexual assault could not be converted into a justification for repeatedly reopening an investigation merely because public speculation had continued.
The defence of the existing investigation was also supported by arguments that the controversy had been amplified by political rivalry and unverified material circulated in the public domain. Senior counsel appearing for Aaditya Thackeray, whose name had been raised by the petitioner’s side, opposed the proceedings and argued that the allegations were politically motivated and rested substantially on hearsay, rumours and claims that had gained circulation through media and social-media narratives. The submission raised a legitimate concern from the standpoint of criminal jurisprudence: a constitutional court cannot permit an investigation to be ordered merely because a case has generated intense public controversy. Public attention is not evidence, and political allegations cannot replace legally admissible material.
Yet the Court’s response demonstrates that the opposite proposition is equally important. The absence of an immediately apparent case cannot become a reason to indefinitely avoid the statutory mechanism for investigation where a specific complaint alleging a cognisable offence is placed before the authorities. The Bench was concerned that the authorities had continued dealing with the matter through the accidental-death framework for an extended period even after allegations questioning the original conclusion had been raised. The Court’s concern was therefore one of legal accountability: if the authorities believed that no offence had occurred, the appropriate course was to conduct a legally sustainable investigation and place its conclusion before the competent court rather than leave the matter in an uncertain procedural state.
The question of the post-mortem report also assumed importance during the hearing. The petitioner’s counsel argued that the family had not been supplied with the report and other investigative documents for several years. The State disputed the implications sought to be drawn from this circumstance and relied upon the medical findings to reject allegations of sexual assault. The Bench, however, indicated that the responsibility of maintaining transparency towards the immediate family in a death investigation cannot be reduced to waiting for the family to repeatedly demand documents. The issue is significant because procedural fairness in a death investigation is not confined to the eventual prosecution of an offender; it also encompasses the legitimate interest of the deceased’s family in knowing how the State arrived at its conclusion regarding the cause of death.
The Court had also examined aspects of the physical and medical evidence during the hearings preceding the order. Questions were raised regarding whether the injuries recorded in the medical material were fully consistent with the alleged fall and whether certain physical circumstances surrounding the incident had been sufficiently examined. The Bench expressly cautioned, however, that such questions did not amount to a judicial finding that the death was homicidal. This distinction is crucial. Courts are entitled to test whether an investigation has adequately examined material circumstances, but identifying an investigative deficiency is not equivalent to establishing the prosecution case.
The State had maintained that the initial accidental-death inquiry was closed within a relatively short period and was subsequently reopened in 2023 after allegations and public claims concerning the circumstances of the death gained prominence. The State further argued that the subsequent examination had not produced strong evidence warranting prosecution for murder. The High Court, however, was concerned with the legal consequences of such an extended inquiry and whether the authorities had followed the correct procedure once the matter had moved beyond the limited purpose of determining the apparent cause of death.
The present order therefore needs to be read carefully. The High Court has not declared that Salian was murdered. It has not accepted as proved the allegations of gang rape or homicide. It has not held that any particular person committed an offence. Instead, it has directed the registration of an FIR and a comprehensive investigation into all aspects surrounding the circumstances in which Salian lost her life. The Court specifically imposed a safeguard that no person should be treated as an accused unless, in the opinion of the investigating officer, the material collected during investigation provides sufficient grounds to raise reasonable suspicion against that person.
That safeguard is perhaps the most legally significant part of the order. An FIR is the beginning of a criminal investigation, not a declaration of guilt. The registration of a case merely activates the investigative machinery of the State. Whether a person is ultimately treated as a suspect, arrested, chargesheeted or prosecuted depends upon the evidence that emerges. By expressly emphasising this principle, the Bench has attempted to prevent the CBI investigation itself from becoming a vehicle for converting allegations made in a highly publicised dispute into predetermined criminal conclusions.
The Court has consequently placed the burden on the investigating agency to follow evidence rather than narrative. The CBI has been directed to appoint a senior and experienced officer and to obtain the statement of Salian’s father. Mumbai Police has been directed to hand over the relevant records and material to the CBI. If the investigation discloses a cognisable offence, the agency is expected to proceed in accordance with law and file the appropriate report before the competent court. If, on the other hand, the investigation does not disclose a prosecutable offence, the CBI has been directed to place an appropriate closure report before the competent court. Salian’s father has expressly been given liberty to challenge such a closure through a protest petition.
The provision for a protest petition is important because it prevents the CBI investigation from becoming a one-sided finality. If the agency ultimately concludes that no offence is made out, the complainant retains the procedural opportunity to contest that conclusion before the competent court. This reflects the broader criminal-process principle that investigative conclusions are not necessarily judicial determinations. The investigating agency collects evidence and forms a prosecutorial view; the court ultimately determines the legal consequences of that material.
The order also raises an important institutional question concerning the use of constitutional writ jurisdiction in criminal investigations. Ordinarily, investigation of offences is the domain of the police and the criminal courts. Constitutional courts do not routinely supervise or replace investigations merely because a complainant is dissatisfied with the police version. At the same time, the High Courts possess wide powers under Article 226 to intervene where the circumstances demonstrate that the ordinary investigative process has failed to inspire confidence, has not followed mandatory procedure or requires an independent agency in the interests of justice. The CBI’s involvement in the present matter must therefore be understood as an exceptional constitutional intervention rather than a declaration that every disputed investigation should automatically be transferred to a central agency.
The timing of the intervention is also noteworthy. Salian’s death occurred in 2020, and the petition seeking fresh investigation came several years later. Ordinarily, delay in challenging an investigation can be a substantial consideration, particularly where evidence may deteriorate, witnesses may become unavailable and forensic reconstruction may become increasingly difficult. The State relied upon this aspect in resisting the petition. Yet the Court appears to have viewed the procedural questions surrounding the investigation as sufficiently significant to warrant a fresh examination notwithstanding the passage of time. This does not mean that delay becomes legally irrelevant; rather, it suggests that where the Court finds a continuing question concerning the legality or adequacy of the investigative process, delay alone may not prevent constitutional intervention.
There is, however, a difficult evidentiary reality that the CBI will now have to confront. Six years have passed since the death. Physical evidence may have deteriorated, memories may have faded, digital material may no longer be readily recoverable and witnesses may have altered their recollections over time. A fresh investigation therefore cannot simply be a repetition of the earlier inquiry under a different agency. Its credibility will depend upon whether the CBI can identify genuinely unexplored material, test the earlier conclusions scientifically and reconstruct the sequence of events using contemporaneous evidence rather than public narratives that developed subsequently.
The case also demonstrates the dangers inherent in the intersection between criminal investigation and celebrity-driven public discourse. Salian’s professional association with Sushant Singh Rajput inevitably placed her death within an already intensely scrutinised public controversy. Over the years, competing theories concerning both deaths have circulated extensively, often without the evidentiary safeguards that accompany a courtroom proceeding. The judicial process must operate differently. Neither the popularity of a theory nor the number of people repeating it increases its evidentiary value. Conversely, the existence of public speculation cannot be used to dismiss legitimate questions regarding whether the State followed the correct investigative procedure.
From this perspective, the High Court’s order represents an attempt to restore the issue from the realm of speculation to the realm of evidence. The CBI has not been directed to prove a particular theory. It has been directed to investigate. That distinction protects both sides: it preserves the family’s right to a legally sustainable determination of the circumstances of death while protecting persons named in the allegations from being prejudged before evidence is collected.
The order also reinforces the importance of institutional closure in criminal investigations. A family confronted with an unexplained death is entitled to a conclusion that has legal and evidentiary legitimacy. If the conclusion is suicide or accidental death, the State must be able to demonstrate how that conclusion was reached. If evidence ultimately establishes homicide or another cognisable offence, the responsible persons must be proceeded against in accordance with law. What is problematic is an indefinite intermediate space in which allegations remain publicly alive while the formal investigative process does not produce a clear prosecutorial or judicial conclusion.
The Bombay High Court’s intervention should therefore not be read as a judicial endorsement of any sensational allegation surrounding Disha Salian’s death. Its real significance lies in insisting that a serious allegation must either be investigated through the procedure prescribed by criminal law or brought to a legally sustainable closure. By ordering an FIR while simultaneously cautioning that no person should be treated as an accused without sufficient material, the Court has maintained the delicate balance between the complainant’s right to investigation and the accused’s foundational protection against prejudgment.
The CBI investigation will now be judged by a much higher standard than the competing public narratives that have surrounded the case. It will have to establish what can actually be proved, distinguish contemporaneous evidence from material generated years later, scrutinise the original investigation without assuming that it was either entirely correct or entirely defective, and follow every legally relevant lead without converting suspicion into accusation. If the evidence ultimately establishes an offence, the appropriate criminal process must follow. If it does not, the closure must be equally clear and legally reasoned.
Ultimately, the Bombay High Court’s decision is less a verdict on the mystery surrounding Disha Salian’s death than a direction to resolve that mystery through law. The Court has neither accepted the allegation of murder nor endorsed the earlier conclusion of suicide. It has instead required the investigative machinery to undertake a formal, independent and comprehensive examination and then place the result before the competent judicial forum. In a case that has for years existed at the intersection of grief, celebrity, politics, media speculation and criminal law, the most consequential message of the order is therefore a simple one: allegations may justify investigation, but only evidence can justify accusation, and only judicial scrutiny can ultimately determine criminal responsibility.
